Lecture 4.3
Authority is rarely exercised by the body that holds it. It is delegated — to an office, a person, a system, and now to an agent that may sub-delegate again. This lecture treats delegation as a first-class object with a grantor, a holder, a scope, conditions, and an expiry, and examines what breaks when a chain of delegations is implicit.
Learning objectives
After this lesson, the reader should understand:
Concept framework
Anatomy of a delegation
Case study
An agent acts 'on behalf of' a team lead, who holds a delegation from a director, whose delegation lapsed at a reorganisation six months ago. The agent's action is challenged. Who authorised it?
On the records, no one — the chain has a broken link, and nothing in the runtime checked the links. Delegation expressed in org charts and email approvals cannot be evaluated at machine speed, so the agent inherited an authority that no longer existed upstream. As objects, each delegation carries its grantor, its term, and its conditions; the runtime resolves the chain before it authorises, and a lapsed link fails closed. The institution's answer to 'who authorised it' should be a path it can print, not a reconstruction it attempts after the fact. A draft specification, NOMOS-SPEC-007, gives this a concrete form: one key certifies another to sign — within a stated scope, until an expiry — and a verifier resolves the whole chain offline against a root the caller pins, with no default root and no call home. Certificate scope is enforced rather than decorative: a delegation for one action does not carry to another. Revocation is keyed on the withdrawn key itself, not on a single certificate, so a revoked key is dead on every path a presenter might construct to it. A chain that does not resolve returns a distinct 'issuer not recognised' outcome, never a verdict — the fix for that is a better chain, and the fix for a denial is not.
Discussion questions
Exercise
Draw one real delegation chain as objects.
Research notes