P-01 · Part II · NOMOS-SPEC-008 0.5.0
Omission safety
Updated Nov 12, 2026 · Authorize the Act, Not the Agent
An agent can leave facts out of what it carries. Proved: if what it carried could commit, the full truth never turns that into a refusal, and never into a weaker approval.
Found by the proof · Oct 2026, while proving it
Three gaps, all closed
- Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval. Two escalations at the same priority: leave out the delinquency fact, and one reviewer approves instead of two senior approvers. The proof would not close; SPEC-008 0.5.0 adds the gate's clause (ii), and the counterexample is mechanized as vector 30.
- A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers. A sealing key may not testify or consent, but it could certify keys that can, so one stolen issuer key could supply the rules, their facts and any quorum. SPEC-007 rev. 1.11 grants statement authority only from the root; @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0 enforces it.
- Order could change a refusal's reason. Two certificates differing only in signature tied, so presentation order decided which refusal was reported. Rev. 1.11 breaks ties on the signature.
Caught by this proof · 3 gaps, all closed
- A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers
- The order of presentation could change a refusal's reason
- Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval
What each one was, and how it was closed →
Proved · Lean 4, core library, standard axioms
| Claim | Theorem |
|---|---|
| Completing the facts keeps an allow an allow, and an escalation the same escalation or an allow | omission_safety |
| Completing the facts never yields DENIED | never_denied |
| Rules read facts monotonically under Kleene's three values | atom_ref, cond_ref |
| The 0.4.0 gate is not omission-safe | Counterexample (vector 30) |
| Theorem 7, sufficiency: an AUTHORIZED verdict means legitimate, current authority on the true facts permits the act, or the right people approved exactly it, here and once | sufficiency (Sufficiency.lean) |
| Theorems 1–6: dropping any one obligation (C1.1, C1.2, C2.1, C2.2, C3, C4) commits what the truth refuses | C11_necessary … C4_necessary |
| Theorem 8: with every read input disclosed truthfully, nothing is undecided and the verdict is the rules' verdict on the truth | completeness, disclosure_is_truth |
| Theorem 10: the verdict is a function of the authority and the facts; exactly one rule decides | reproducibility, decider_unique |
| Propositions 2–3: a delegate never exceeds a constraint above it; revoking any key or certificate on a path fails it | no_amplification, revocation_complete (Chain.lean) |
| Statement authority comes from the root: no key that may seal is an ancestor of a witness or an approver | statement_authority_from_root |
| Theorem 9: a lying witness moves only the facts it is certified for; forged consents never turn a refusal into a commit, and a quorum of n needs n distinct keys | witness_compromise, approver_compromise, quorum_needs_n_keys (Containment.lean) |
Attacks
Each obligation removed from the reference verifier, then attacked with genuine statements only. Every attack commits something the truth refuses or nobody approved.
| Obligation removed | Attacks | Without it |
|---|---|---|
| Three-valued evaluation | 4 | AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED |
| Consent bound to the exact act | 5 | AUTHORIZED, not what was approved |
| The relying party pins its own root | 1 | AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED |
| Facts only through declared channels | 1 | AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED |
| Currency separate from authenticity | 1 | AUTHORIZED, truth ESCALATED |
Model check · random rule sets, every partial state
| Gate | States checked | Unsafe commits |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 (proved) | 710,978 | 0 |
| 0.4.0 | 719,750 | 2,320 |
| Missing fact read as false | 1,007,312 | 144,001 |
Not yet proved
- That either implementation matches the Lean model. Both agree on every published vector and 1,804 derived mutants; agreement is tested, not proved.
- That witnesses tell the truth. Certification limits which facts a key may state, not whether they are true.
- Signatures: assumed unforgeable, not modelled. In Theorem 7 the truthful-outcome part is composed from omission safety; the other parts follow from the checks under the paper's assumptions A1, A2 and A4 and a collision-resistant digest.
- Proposition 4 (order independence): restored in SPEC-007 rev. 1.11 and tested by its vectors in every listed order, not modelled.
- Independence: the proof, ablations and model check were written by the specification's authors.
Run it yourself
git clone https://github.com/nomos-spec/spec cd spec/papers/carried-authority/lean && lean CarriedAuthority.lean # Lean 4.35 cd ../.. && lake build Sufficiency Completeness Containment Chain # Theorems 1-10; Propositions 2-3 cd carried-authority && python3 ablate.py vectors_040.json # 12/12 attacks