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P-01 · Part II · NOMOS-SPEC-008 0.5.0

Omission safety

Updated Nov 12, 2026 · Authorize the Act, Not the Agent

An agent can leave facts out of what it carries. Proved: if what it carried could commit, the full truth never turns that into a refusal, and never into a weaker approval.

Found by the proof · Oct 2026, while proving it

Three gaps, all closed

  • Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval. Two escalations at the same priority: leave out the delinquency fact, and one reviewer approves instead of two senior approvers. The proof would not close; SPEC-008 0.5.0 adds the gate's clause (ii), and the counterexample is mechanized as vector 30.
  • A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers. A sealing key may not testify or consent, but it could certify keys that can, so one stolen issuer key could supply the rules, their facts and any quorum. SPEC-007 rev. 1.11 grants statement authority only from the root; @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0 enforces it.
  • Order could change a refusal's reason. Two certificates differing only in signature tied, so presentation order decided which refusal was reported. Rev. 1.11 breaks ties on the signature.

Caught by this proof · 3 gaps, all closed

  • A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers
  • The order of presentation could change a refusal's reason
  • Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval

What each one was, and how it was closed →

Proved · Lean 4, core library, standard axioms

ClaimTheorem
Completing the facts keeps an allow an allow, and an escalation the same escalation or an allowomission_safety
Completing the facts never yields DENIEDnever_denied
Rules read facts monotonically under Kleene's three valuesatom_ref, cond_ref
The 0.4.0 gate is not omission-safeCounterexample (vector 30)
Theorem 7, sufficiency: an AUTHORIZED verdict means legitimate, current authority on the true facts permits the act, or the right people approved exactly it, here and oncesufficiency (Sufficiency.lean)
Theorems 1–6: dropping any one obligation (C1.1, C1.2, C2.1, C2.2, C3, C4) commits what the truth refusesC11_necessary … C4_necessary
Theorem 8: with every read input disclosed truthfully, nothing is undecided and the verdict is the rules' verdict on the truthcompleteness, disclosure_is_truth
Theorem 10: the verdict is a function of the authority and the facts; exactly one rule decidesreproducibility, decider_unique
Propositions 2–3: a delegate never exceeds a constraint above it; revoking any key or certificate on a path fails itno_amplification, revocation_complete (Chain.lean)
Statement authority comes from the root: no key that may seal is an ancestor of a witness or an approverstatement_authority_from_root
Theorem 9: a lying witness moves only the facts it is certified for; forged consents never turn a refusal into a commit, and a quorum of n needs n distinct keyswitness_compromise, approver_compromise, quorum_needs_n_keys (Containment.lean)

Attacks

Each obligation removed from the reference verifier, then attacked with genuine statements only. Every attack commits something the truth refuses or nobody approved.

Obligation removedAttacksWithout it
Three-valued evaluation4AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED
Consent bound to the exact act5AUTHORIZED, not what was approved
The relying party pins its own root1AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED
Facts only through declared channels1AUTHORIZED, truth DENIED
Currency separate from authenticity1AUTHORIZED, truth ESCALATED

Model check · random rule sets, every partial state

GateStates checkedUnsafe commits
0.5.0 (proved)710,9780
0.4.0719,7502,320
Missing fact read as false1,007,312144,001

Not yet proved

  • That either implementation matches the Lean model. Both agree on every published vector and 1,804 derived mutants; agreement is tested, not proved.
  • That witnesses tell the truth. Certification limits which facts a key may state, not whether they are true.
  • Signatures: assumed unforgeable, not modelled. In Theorem 7 the truthful-outcome part is composed from omission safety; the other parts follow from the checks under the paper's assumptions A1, A2 and A4 and a collision-resistant digest.
  • Proposition 4 (order independence): restored in SPEC-007 rev. 1.11 and tested by its vectors in every listed order, not modelled.
  • Independence: the proof, ablations and model check were written by the specification's authors.

Run it yourself

git clone https://github.com/nomos-spec/spec
cd spec/papers/carried-authority/lean && lean CarriedAuthority.lean   # Lean 4.35
cd ../.. && lake build Sufficiency Completeness Containment Chain  # Theorems 1-10; Propositions 2-3
cd carried-authority && python3 ablate.py vectors_040.json  # 12/12 attacks

The proof and the evidence →

NOMOS-SPEC-008 →