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Research · Proofs

Caught by proof

We do not wait for incidents. Every specification in this series is checked by machine, and a proof that will not close has found something. These are the gaps our own proofs found in our own work, how each was closed, and the published test that keeps it closed.

11

Found by proof

11

Closed

0

Found by an incident

4

Specifications hardened

NOMOS-SPEC-007 rev. 1.10 → rev. 1.11 · @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0

A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers

We claimed

No single key can both seal rules and supply the facts or approvals those rules read.

The proof found

A sealing key may not testify or consent itself, but it could certify keys that can. One stolen issuer key could supply the rules, the facts they read, and an approver for every person a quorum asks for.

Closed by

Statement authority now comes from the root: a key may certify witnesses or approvers only if the root granted it that authority itself.

Kept closed by

sealing_key_cannot_certify_a_witness, sealing_key_cannot_certify_an_approver · statement_authority_from_root

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-01 Omission safety

NOMOS-SPEC-007 rev. 1.10 → rev. 1.11 · @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0

The order of presentation could change a refusal's reason

We claimed

The verdict depends on the certificates presented, never on their order.

The proof found

Two certificates differing only in their signature tied in the resolver's ordering, so the order they arrived in decided which refusal was reported. Never a wrongful acceptance; still not the same answer.

Closed by

Ties break on the signature.

Kept closed by

same_payload_certificates_in_every_order

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-01 Omission safety

NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

An issuance proof could choose its own date

We claimed

Issuance is judged under the constitution in force, never the one the proof names.

The proof found

The proof's own date set which constitution applied. A November seal claiming May was issued under April's rules, after the board had tightened them.

Closed by

The constitution is the one in force when the seal was made, as the relying party knows it; the proof's date must lie within a bound of that.

Kept closed by

attack-backdated-issuance · backdating_issues, officer_indifference

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance

NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

Consents were counted by the role they claimed

We claimed

No officer can issue an authority without the quorum the constitution names.

The proof found

A consent counted for the role written on it. The officer could write his own quorum, for a policy or for a friendlier constitution.

Closed by

A consent counts only from a holder certified for its role.

Kept closed by

attack-invented-consents · invented_consents_issue, forged_amendment

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance

NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

Two constitutions starting together made the answer order-dependent

We claimed

Verification is the same under any presentation order.

The proof found

With two constitutions in force from the same instant, which one counted as the genesis depended on the order they were listed in.

Closed by

Such a chain is refused as ambiguous, the same way in every order.

Kept closed by

ambiguous-in-force-time · the shuffle check

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance

NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

A closure's list was never read

We claimed

Law leaves the applicable set only through a signed statement that says so.

The proof found

The resolver checked that a closure was recent, never what it listed. A withdrawn law silently dropped out while the current closure still named it, for up to 90 days.

Closed by

A closure must agree with the registrar's own log, and withdrawals re-sign it automatically.

Kept closed by

attack-withdrawal-under-closure · hiding_needs_new_closure

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution

NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

A stale copy of a log looked live

We claimed

Resolution answers for the law as it stands now.

The proof found

A cached copy whose closure was still inside its own bound answered with law the live log had already replaced.

Closed by

A relying party bounds how old a copy may be; past it, the answer is held open.

Kept closed by

attack-stale-view · stale_view_commits

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution

NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 vectors → 0.2.0

A test that tested the wrong attack

We claimed

Each condition is shown necessary by an attack that succeeds without it.

The proof found

The currency test switched the check off entirely, which only adds law and so can never let an act through. The real attack, judging membership at a stale moment, was untested.

Closed by

The test now judges membership at a stale instant, and the attack it shows is the one that matters.

Kept closed by

attack-zombie-authority · C7_necessary_snapshot

Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution

Part III draft · NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 §8 → before publication

An attack the design already prevents

We claimed

Jurisdiction squatting could launder approvals.

The proof found

Under strict combination, added law can only add refusals. The attack described cannot happen; the condition's real job is to stop wrongful refusals.

Closed by

The paper and the specification state what the condition actually protects.

Kept closed by

noC6_never_commits_more

Caught Nov 11, 2026 · P-02 Resolution

Part III draft → before publication

A combination order that would approve an undecided act

We claimed

Combining several authorities' verdicts loses no refusal.

The proof found

Ranking an escalation above an undecided result let a person approve while one authority had not yet decided, possibly a refusal.

Closed by

Undecided outranks escalation, as the specification and the resolver already required.

Kept closed by

paper_comb_unsafe · combAll_perm

Caught Nov 11, 2026 · P-02 Resolution

NOMOS-SPEC-008 0.4.0 → 0.5.0

Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval

We claimed

Leaving facts out never earns a better outcome.

The proof found

With two escalations at the same priority, leaving out one fact made a single reviewer enough where two senior approvers were required.

Closed by

An undecided escalation at the same priority, naming a different escalation, now holds the answer open.

Kept closed by

vector 30 · omission_safety

Caught Oct 2026 · P-01 Omission safety

Why this page exists

A guarantee is worth what it would take to break it. Ours are proved in Lean against the code that runs, every attack is published as a test any implementation must pass, and anyone can re-run both in seconds. A standard that publishes what its proofs caught can be checked; one that does not can only be trusted.

Independent implementations, and attempts to break what is proved, are invited. The proofs →