Research · Proofs
Caught by proof
We do not wait for incidents. Every specification in this series is checked by machine, and a proof that will not close has found something. These are the gaps our own proofs found in our own work, how each was closed, and the published test that keeps it closed.
11
Found by proof
11
Closed
0
Found by an incident
4
Specifications hardened
NOMOS-SPEC-007 rev. 1.10 → rev. 1.11 · @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0
A sealing key could create witnesses and approvers
We claimed
No single key can both seal rules and supply the facts or approvals those rules read.
The proof found
A sealing key may not testify or consent itself, but it could certify keys that can. One stolen issuer key could supply the rules, the facts they read, and an approver for every person a quorum asks for.
Closed by
Statement authority now comes from the root: a key may certify witnesses or approvers only if the root granted it that authority itself.
Kept closed by
sealing_key_cannot_certify_a_witness, sealing_key_cannot_certify_an_approver · statement_authority_from_root
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-01 Omission safety
NOMOS-SPEC-007 rev. 1.10 → rev. 1.11 · @nomosprotocol/verify 1.5.0
The order of presentation could change a refusal's reason
We claimed
The verdict depends on the certificates presented, never on their order.
The proof found
Two certificates differing only in their signature tied in the resolver's ordering, so the order they arrived in decided which refusal was reported. Never a wrongful acceptance; still not the same answer.
Closed by
Ties break on the signature.
Kept closed by
same_payload_certificates_in_every_order
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-01 Omission safety
NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
An issuance proof could choose its own date
We claimed
Issuance is judged under the constitution in force, never the one the proof names.
The proof found
The proof's own date set which constitution applied. A November seal claiming May was issued under April's rules, after the board had tightened them.
Closed by
The constitution is the one in force when the seal was made, as the relying party knows it; the proof's date must lie within a bound of that.
Kept closed by
attack-backdated-issuance · backdating_issues, officer_indifference
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance
NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
Consents were counted by the role they claimed
We claimed
No officer can issue an authority without the quorum the constitution names.
The proof found
A consent counted for the role written on it. The officer could write his own quorum, for a policy or for a friendlier constitution.
Closed by
A consent counts only from a holder certified for its role.
Kept closed by
attack-invented-consents · invented_consents_issue, forged_amendment
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance
NOMOS-SPEC-015 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
Two constitutions starting together made the answer order-dependent
We claimed
Verification is the same under any presentation order.
The proof found
With two constitutions in force from the same instant, which one counted as the genesis depended on the order they were listed in.
Closed by
Such a chain is refused as ambiguous, the same way in every order.
Kept closed by
ambiguous-in-force-time · the shuffle check
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-03 Issuance
NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
A closure's list was never read
We claimed
Law leaves the applicable set only through a signed statement that says so.
The proof found
The resolver checked that a closure was recent, never what it listed. A withdrawn law silently dropped out while the current closure still named it, for up to 90 days.
Closed by
A closure must agree with the registrar's own log, and withdrawals re-sign it automatically.
Kept closed by
attack-withdrawal-under-closure · hiding_needs_new_closure
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution
NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
A stale copy of a log looked live
We claimed
Resolution answers for the law as it stands now.
The proof found
A cached copy whose closure was still inside its own bound answered with law the live log had already replaced.
Closed by
A relying party bounds how old a copy may be; past it, the answer is held open.
Kept closed by
attack-stale-view · stale_view_commits
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution
NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 vectors → 0.2.0
A test that tested the wrong attack
We claimed
Each condition is shown necessary by an attack that succeeds without it.
The proof found
The currency test switched the check off entirely, which only adds law and so can never let an act through. The real attack, judging membership at a stale moment, was untested.
Closed by
The test now judges membership at a stale instant, and the attack it shows is the one that matters.
Kept closed by
attack-zombie-authority · C7_necessary_snapshot
Caught Nov 12, 2026 · P-02 Resolution
Part III draft · NOMOS-SPEC-014 0.1.0 §8 → before publication
An attack the design already prevents
We claimed
Jurisdiction squatting could launder approvals.
The proof found
Under strict combination, added law can only add refusals. The attack described cannot happen; the condition's real job is to stop wrongful refusals.
Closed by
The paper and the specification state what the condition actually protects.
Kept closed by
noC6_never_commits_more
Caught Nov 11, 2026 · P-02 Resolution
Part III draft → before publication
A combination order that would approve an undecided act
We claimed
Combining several authorities' verdicts loses no refusal.
The proof found
Ranking an escalation above an undecided result let a person approve while one authority had not yet decided, possibly a refusal.
Closed by
Undecided outranks escalation, as the specification and the resolver already required.
Kept closed by
paper_comb_unsafe · combAll_perm
Caught Nov 11, 2026 · P-02 Resolution
NOMOS-SPEC-008 0.4.0 → 0.5.0
Withholding one fact bought a weaker approval
We claimed
Leaving facts out never earns a better outcome.
The proof found
With two escalations at the same priority, leaving out one fact made a single reviewer enough where two senior approvers were required.
Closed by
An undecided escalation at the same priority, naming a different escalation, now holds the answer open.
Kept closed by
vector 30 · omission_safety
Caught Oct 2026 · P-01 Omission safety
Why this page exists
A guarantee is worth what it would take to break it. Ours are proved in Lean against the code that runs, every attack is published as a test any implementation must pass, and anyone can re-run both in seconds. A standard that publishes what its proofs caught can be checked; one that does not can only be trusted.
Independent implementations, and attempts to break what is proved, are invited. The proofs →